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THE PARENT TRAP: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE OF SEVERING PARENTAL RIGHTS
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Kendra Huard Fershee*
ABSTRACT
In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA) to stem what it perceived as an overreliance by states on foster
care to provide a safe place for children whose parents had been
accused of abuse or neglect. Prior to ASFA, many children were placed
in foster care for extended periods of time while their parents were
evaluated for fitness and rehabilitative efforts were made to reunify
families. Congress considered the time children spent in foster care as
damaging to them because it left them uncertain about where they
would live in the future. Congress, in an attempt to reduce the amount
of time children spend in foster care, included provisions in ASFA that
require states to expedite termination of parental rights to such a speed
that states have been engaging in, for many years, systematic
deprivation of parents’ procedural and substantive due process rights.
Child abuse and neglect have always been a problem in every
society, but many cultures, including American culture, have a poor
track record of successfully addressing the problem. Early American
history shows a lack of appreciation or understanding of the problem,
and the evolution of policies to combat child abuse and neglect has
been slow and somewhat ineffectual. At the same time, courts have not
had a spectacular record of effectively addressing the problem of child
abuse and neglect. The Supreme Court was slow to consider problems
related to families and did not decide a case regarding the rights of
parents to the care, control, and custody of their children until the late
1920s. And it was not until the 1980s that the Court finally declared
that parents have a substantive due process right to the custody of their
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children.
Even though it took many years, the Supreme Court’s recent
recognition of protections for the procedural and substantive due
process rights of parents is clear: states must be extremely cautious
when seeking to terminate parental rights. However, after ASFA, the
opposite has been happening. States have every incentive to rush to
judgment and sever parental rights, even when there is no evidence the
parent ever abused the child being removed and even when the parent
is someone who could be a wonderful, loving, and caring parent. These
due process violations occur in the context of ASFA provisions that
make exceptions to the requirement that states make reasonable efforts
to reunify families separated after an allegation of abuse or neglect.
In the second most constitutionally problematic provision of ASFA,
states may forego reasonable efforts to reunite parents with a removed
child (automatically at birth, in many circumstances) when the parents
have previously lost custody of a sibling. Then, in the most
constitutionally problematic provision, states must rush to terminate
the parental rights of those individuals, even with no evidence they
would be unfit to parent the newborn child. Unfortunately, many state
courts apply these provisions with heavy hands, resulting in improper
terminations or near misses that are overturned upon appeal. Congress
must change ASFA to incentivize states to act in accordance with the
Constitution when terminating parental rights, and the Supreme Court
should issue binding precedent to prohibit permanent severance of
parental rights based on evidence of past misconduct alone. Until then,
parents are extremely vulnerable to state court judges who are guided
by an unconstitutional statute and who may not appreciate the
constitutional risks in its application.
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INTRODUCTION
A baby is born every eight seconds in the United States.1 At that
moment, several constitutional rights are also born, including the
constitutional rights of parents to the care, custody, and control of their
child.2 The constitutional right of parents to direct and control the
upbringing of their child was one of the first substantive due process
rights the Supreme Court recognized.3 Parental rights are among the
most sacrosanct rights in American jurisprudence, require a high
standard of proof before a state can interfere with them, and are
carefully guarded by courts.4 Or are they?
Of course, the constitutional right of parents to direct and control
the upbringing of their child, like every constitutional right, is not
absolute. It can be severed when a parent poses a substantial risk to the
physical or emotional health or safety of the child.5 Over the last ninety
years, since the Supreme Court first recognized the liberty interests of
a parent,6 courts and legislatures have struggled to balance individuals’

1. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“In light of [the] extensive precedent, it cannot now
be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”). For the purposes
of this Article, parental rights generally mean the rights of biological mothers and married couples because
the parental rights of unmarried biological fathers are less protected by the Due Process Clause. Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124–25 (1989) (holding that a man who fathered a child with a married
woman did not have a due process right to challenge California’s recognition of the mother’s husband as
the legal father of the child, even when the biological father had a well-established relationship with the
child); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (holding that the due process rights of a putative
father who had not “grasp[ed] [the] opportunity” of building a relationship with his child were not violated
when he was not notified of an impending adoption proceeding of his daughter); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 249, 254–56 (1978) (holding that a biological father who never legitimated his child by filing
paperwork to claim the child as his was not deprived of his due process rights when his parental rights
were terminated).
3. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399–400 (1923).
4. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400 (“The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”).
5. E.g., In re J.H., 523 S.E.2d 374, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the lower court’s termination
of parental rights when “the mother exposed the child to an abusive, nomadic, and turbulent lifestyle filled
with unrehabilitated drug use and violence”).
6. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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rights to parent and children’s rights to be free from harm.7 The
definition of harm has grown and evolved, as has the notion of what it
means to have a liberty interest to parent.8 Placing the fulcrum in the
precise location to perfectly balance the rights of children and their
parents has proven nearly impossible, and in the last twenty years or
so, states and Congress have made matters worse by striving for
efficiency in the process of seeking permanence for children whose
parents have been accused of being unfit to parent.9
In a well-intentioned effort to protect children from harm, Congress
and many states have enacted one-size-fits-all laws that work to sever
a parent’s constitutional rights in an efficient, if nevertheless
unconstitutional, manner. This happens in a couple ways. First, some
states have devised plans that require removal of newborns from their
parents’ custody before they have even left the hospital and without
any evidence of abuse or neglect, typically because their parental rights
had been previously involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling
of the newborn. In those cases, under the federal statutory scheme,
states can and indeed are encouraged to forego efforts to seek
reunification. These procedural requirements, in all their efficiency,
create a perfect storm for some parents, making it impossible for them
to (1) prevent their children from being whisked away at birth and (2)
retain their parental rights to those children once they are removed
from their custody.10
There are serious constitutional concerns with state interference at
both stages. First, some states, as a matter of course, remove newborns
from the custody of parents whose parental rights to other children
have been terminated in the past.11 Next, the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA) gives financial incentives to states enacting its
7. For a discussion of balancing the state’s parens patriae interest in protecting the child and the
parent’s due process rights, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–68 (1982). The medical
community has also discussed this issue for the last four decades. Theo Solomon, History and
Demography of Child Abuse, 51 PEDIATRICS 773, 774–75 (1973). “In child welfare today, the basic
problem still exists: at what point does the harm of leaving a child in an abusive environment override the
negative consequences of splintering the family . . . ?” Id. at 774.
8. See discussion infra Part I.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.A.
11. See infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
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dictates, which include a provision allowing state child welfare
agencies to refuse to make reasonable efforts to reunite parents with
children removed from their custody if their parental rights to another
child have been involuntarily terminated.12 Third, some state laws are
so onerous that many parents, including those who would be good
parents to the removed children, cannot meet the expectations and lose
parental rights in a very short period of time.13 Legislation allowing
the removal of newborns without evidence of abuse and requiring the
expedited processes toward final termination of parental rights violates
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and must be amended to allow parents to
retain their procedural and substantive due process rights to parent.
I. THE EVOLVING DOCTRINE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PARENT
The belief that a state has the right or even the duty to intervene
when a child has been abused is a somewhat modern notion. In the
early years of America’s history, the number of laws aimed at
protecting children from their parents’ abuse was nearly zero. States
simply did not see it as within the power or province of the government
to interfere with a parent’s methods of discipline.14
A. Children as the Father’s Chattel
Historically, in many cultures, children were considered the
property of their fathers.15 They could be sold at the will of the father,
beaten for any reason at all, or even murdered if the parents or
community deemed it necessary to be rid of an extra mouth to feed.16
The notion that children were the property of their fathers meant they
12.
13.
14.
15.

42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)(iii) (2006).
See infra Part III.B.2.
See BRIAN CORBY, CHILD ABUSE: TOWARDS A KNOWLEDGE BASE 17–21 (1993).
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 235–38 (1985); MARGARET O. HYDE , C RY S OFTLY ! T HE S TORY OF C HILD
ABUSE 36 (1980).
16. HYDE , supra note 15, at 34–41.
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could be treated in any way the father felt appropriate and no one could
intervene on behalf of the child.17 The Code of Hammurabi, based on
Babylonian law instituted as early as 2130 B.C., permitted fathers to
sell their children or wives in payment of a debt.18 Life was hard for
everyone in ancient times, and children were perceived as little more
than hungry, expensive burdens who were lucky to have been allowed
to live after birth.19
In early American colonial times, children fared little better than
their counterparts in ancient times.20 They were still considered the
father’s chattel and were subjected to horrific abuse, which was lawful
if intended to correct the misdeeds of the child as defined by the
father.21 As long as the parent did not murder the child, the punishment
was considered lawful.22 Children who did not have parents or children
whose parents were too poor to protect them were likely to be entered
into indentured servitude.23 The concept that children were property of
the father spilled over to the belief that parentless children were either
a burden or a commodity to ignore or trade as needed.24
Indentured servants were required to work in exchange for the basic
necessities in life.25 The agreements of servitude often carried with
them some protections against mistreatment, but in reality, could do
little to actually stop an abusive master from brutally disciplining his
servant.26 Although the system was meant to provide children with
17. Id. at 37; MARIA SCANNAPIECO & KELLI CONNELL-CARRICK, UNDERSTANDING CHILD
MALTREATMENT: AN ECOLOGICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (2005).
18. HYDE , supra note 15, at 36.
19. See id. at 37–39.
20. See LE R OY A SHBY , ENDANGERED C HILDREN : D EPENDENCY , N EGLECT , AND A BUSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 6–7 (1997).
21. Id.; Marvin Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children’s Law and
Practice, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 66.
22. See ASHBY, supra note 20, at 6–7.
23. Id. at 7–8; JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 11–
12 (2006) (“Involuntary apprenticeship was used for substantial numbers of poor children and orphans.
Local officials had authority to remove dependent children from their parents and place the children with
masters.”). Placing impoverished children in indentured servant arrangements originated from the British
“poor laws.” Janet L. Dolgin, Transforming Childhood: Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW. ENG.
L. REV. 1113, 1122 (1997).
24. ASHBY , supra note 20, at 10–14.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 6–8; GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 264–66.
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some education, food, shelter, and other basic needs in life, it was a
poorly monitored system that left children to the whims of their
masters.27 The Kansas territorial legislature, in 1855, made it legal to
bind orphaned children to servitude and included a provision stating
that killing servants in the process of disciplining them was not
considered a crime.28 During the time these types of laws and
agreements reigned, however, attitudes about the role of children in
society started to change.29
Over time, society began to slowly accept the notion that children
were more than their father’s possessions, that they deserved at least
some basic protection from harm.30 In an increasingly industrial
society, work shifted away from the home.31 Men began to work in
mills and factories, leaving their wives to care for the home and the
children.32 Especially in middle- and upper-class families, the sphere
of the home became dominated by the idealized concept of mothers as
the noble and moral protectors of their families, and children were
perceived as innocent, pure creatures deserving of their mothers’
tender loving care.33 These “cult of motherhood” notions may have
contributed, in part, to the beginning of a new and more charitable
societal attitude about the role of children within the family.34
In the mid- to late-1800s, concerned citizens began to form societies
for the purpose of “child-saving,” rescuing children from harmful
living situations.35 The shift started at the grassroots level and was
disjointed, disorganized, and unfocused.36 The challenges facing
27. See ASHBY , supra note 20, at 21; MYERS, supra note 23, at 12.
28. ASHBY , supra note 20, at 21.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.; LELA B. C OSTIN ET AL., THE P OLITICS OF C HILD A BUSE IN A MERICA 50–51 (Duncan
Lindsey ed., 1996); see BARBARA J. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA
SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 6 (1984). The modern family stems from the bourgeoisie of the late
1800s. NELSON, supra, at 6. Upper-class families tended to recognize that children had natural rights, and
in these homes, excessive violence was not tolerated. See id.
34. See ASHBY , supra note 20, at 19.
35. C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 46; MYERS supra note 23, at 37 (“By 1880, there were thirtyseven [nongovernmental] child protection societies in the United States.”).
36. See C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 46–47.
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families in these times were numerous and particularly affected
children through child abuse, poverty, child labor, poor access to
medical attention, lack of educational opportunities, and more.37 The
theories and philosophies addressing the problems faced by children
varied, but a common theme began to develop: to separate children
from their parents in the name of saving the children.38 Of course, this
theory was nearly always employed against families struggling with
poverty, where it was believed that families with financial strains were
ill equipped to raise children who could contribute to society
meaningfully.39
As society began to awaken to the plight of children in abusive
homes and the difficulties poverty presented to some children’s lives,
states began to look at the needs of children when deciding what
should happen to those who had been abused or were the subject of a
custody dispute.40 When evaluating custody disputes, courts began to
consider “the best interests of the child,” and on occasion, broke with
the long-standing legal practice of automatically awarding custody to
the father.41 The “tender years doctrine” allowed mothers to retain
custody of their very young children, while fathers were still awarded
custody of any older children.42 This change was obviously rooted in
gender-specific notions about the skills it takes to raise children, but it
37. See id. During the mid- to late-1800s, the population of urban industrial areas grew immensely.
ASHBY , supra note 20, at 41. Many “child savers” condemned the immigrant urban lifestyle and believed
that urban “corruption” bred juvenile delinquents. See ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 40–41 (2d ed. 1977). This belief reinforced the notion that children of poor
families were better served by being taken out of their homes in the city and “reformed.” See id. at 61–
62.
38. ASHBY , supra note 20, at 23–29. For instance, The New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children favored “rescuing” children and separating them from their homes rather than
rehabilitating families. NELSON, supra note 33, at 8.
39. See ASHBY , supra note 20, at 22–24; see also DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 17
(2d ed. 2004) (“[Many times] children were removed from impoverished lone mothers and placed in ‘good
Christian homes’ in the country, which were viewed as providing a clean wholesome environment . . . .”).
40. ASHBY , supra note 20, at 19.
41. Id. Many scholars cite the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, which forced many men
to work away from the home, as the impetus for the cultural shift to presume that children fair better in
their mother’s custody. See Cynthia A. McNeely, Comment, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood,
Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 898–99 (1998).
42. See ASHBY , supra note 20, at 19. Most states followed the tender years doctrine until the late
1960s. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender Years
Doctrine, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 769, 774 (2004).
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signaled a change in courts’ willingness to consider the needs of
children, not just the legal rights of their fathers, when determining
custody.43 This change in approach, to include understanding
children’s needs, ushered in a new era of court interference with
families and initiated the burgeoning concept of “judicial
patriarchy.”44
B. Hyper-interference by the State Into Family Life
From today’s perspective, it is almost impossible to imagine how
society could have accepted the notion of children as chattel,
essentially less than human, and defined by a value that lay wholly
with their fathers. But in the mid-1800s, private organizations started
to recognize the problem and began to intervene, trying to effect
change.45 Government, both federal and state, followed suit in the late
1800s and took a special interest in protecting children from neglect
and abuse by their caregivers.46 Interestingly, in the 1920s, the issue
faded again, until the 1960s, when a resurgence of interest in protecting
children from harm began.47 Despite the fact that society has been only
intermittently concerned with child abuse, when it is an issue at the
forefront of society’s consciousness, the government has responded by
erring on the side of a hyper-adversarial interference into family life,
43. See ASHBY , supra note 20, at 19; C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 62.
44. See C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 61–62. Michael Grossberg coined the term “judicial
patriarchy” in his book GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA. Id. Grossberg discussed the increased willingness of courts and legislators to intervene in
familial matters in the nineteenth century:
Judges were new kinds of patriarchs, ones invested with a power over some domestic
relations that rivaled that of their predecessors. They used the broad discretionary authority
conferred on them by equity and common-law procedures, and conceded by legislative
inertia, to rewrite the laws governing the allocation of resources, rights, and duties within
the home and between family members and the state.
GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 290.
45. MYERS, supra note 23, at 37.
46. See id. at 58; see also LINDSEY, supra note 39, at 24 & Figure 1.2 (charting the growth of child
welfare agencies in the mid-twentieth century). The number of employees in the public child welfare
system increased during this time. LINDSEY, supra note 39, at 24 & Figure 1.2. In 1960, there were roughly
7,500 employees. Id. By 1976, this number grew to roughly 30,000 employees. Id.
47. See MYERS, supra note 23, at 72, 76. (“The Great Depression . . . hastened the demise of
nongovernmental SPCCs. The charitable contributions that were the lifeblood of SPCCs dried up with the
economy . . . .”).
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instead of a more collegial, problem-solving approach.48
1. The Beginnings of the “Child-Saving” Movement: The Mid- to
Late-1800s
In the mid- to late-1800s, it appeared that society had begun to
understand that control of the parent-child relationship was not solely
within the province of the father. And although the “cult of
motherhood” idea began to emerge, exalting women in their roles as
protectors of children and caretakers of the family, the male-dominated
legal community was reluctant to recognize mothers as having legal
custodial rights to their children in many cases.49 In a somewhat
expected yet still shocking shift, upon complaints of abuse or neglect,
courts began to rescind the parental rights and responsibilities of
fathers and insert the state, instead of the mother, as the caretaker of
the children.50 The change was dubbed the beginning of judicial
patriarchy, where judges trusted themselves and the state to better care
for children who had suffered abuse at home rather than mothers who
may have had no part in the abuse.51 This new attitude created an
adversarial relationship between courts and parents deemed unfit,52
and it likely set the stage for the current struggle over the balance of
power between states and parents to direct and control the upbringing
of children.
As has been evidenced by the foregoing discussion of the rights of
parents (fathers, really) to direct and control the upbringing of their
children and the state’s willingness or reluctance to insert itself into
that relationship, harmony between the two parties is elusive. Trying
to protect children from harm within the family, while protecting the
autonomy of the family unit, are, in many ways, necessarily
incongruous efforts. The state is right to concern itself with the welfare
of all children, and when a parent is accused of abuse or neglect, the
state must take steps to protect the child at risk. The complexity of the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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family dynamic and the attachment that children have to their parents
make it difficult to strike the perfect balance between appropriate
intervention and improper or unlawful interference. But when, more
than one hundred years ago, government began to understand its role
in protecting children from family abuse as a necessity in some
circumstances, the pendulum swung too far in the direction of injecting
the state into the family.53
Theories abound to explain how child abuse went from a family
matter that was little discussed and widely ignored to a major societal
issue that garnered significant political attention.54 Probably the most
widely held theory centered on the story of Mary Ellen Connolly, an
abused child who, at ten years old, became the center of a national
news story.55 The abuse that Mary Ellen suffered was not unlike that
which many children suffered at the time, but because of the efforts of
a few people who took a particular interest in Mary Ellen’s plight, her
story became highly publicized and widely reported.56 The often
“lurid” reporting of the abuse she suffered and the process of
attempting to remove Mary Ellen from the custody of her guardians
was met with outrage from the public, and many people believe, was
a major contributor to the beginnings of the anti-cruelty to children
movement in the late-1800s.57 However, an entire movement cannot
be built or sustained on a single motivator alone, and there were many
issues rising in societal consciousness that made child abuse a rallying
point for activists seeking change in the American social construct at
the time Mary Ellen’s abuse became known.58
After a few months of trying to intervene on Mary Ellen’s behalf
without success, Etta Wheeler called upon Henry Bergh, who was, at
the time, President of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals in New York City.59 Mr. Bergh turned to the Society’s general

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See ASHBY , supra note 20, at 57–59; C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 74.
ASHBY , supra note 20, at 55–59; C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 51–57.
ASHBY , supra note 20, at 55; C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 52.
ASHBY , supra note 20, at 57; C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 57–61.
C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 74.
Id. at 53.
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counsel, Elbridge Gerry, for help.60 At the time in New York, there
were no laws prohibiting children from being abused by their parents,
but there were laws preventing cruelty to animals.61 With help from
Ms. Wheeler, Mr. Bergh, and Mr. Gerry, the argument was made that
Mary Ellen was an animal deserving of protection under the statute,
and so the legend goes, Mary Ellen’s adoptive parent was sentenced to
prison within days of their intervention.62 And, almost as swiftly, the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was
born.63
Elbridge Gerry was an influential and passionate figure in the anticruelty movement.64 He began to build the anti-cruelty movement by
bringing together wealthy and powerful white men who were
interested in combating child abuse, though primarily through the
notion of social control of society’s “less fortunate” members.65 Social
control is the notion that society’s challenges and difficulties can be
confronted and improved by forcing people to behave in certain
ways.66 Elbridge Gerry sought to end child abuse by prosecuting
abusive parents who were morally low, and as considered by Gerry, to
be hardened, drawn to impurity, and part of a “dangerous class” of
people.67 Gerry was not alone in his contempt for the “class” of people
who abused children, and this classist and patriarchal attitude set the
tone for courts who were beginning to awaken to the child abuse
problem in America at the time.68
At the same time Mary Ellen’s case was making headlines, several
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. This legend is inaccurate in many ways, including the timeline of bringing Mrs. Connolly to
justice for Mary Ellen’s abuse, which was actually much slower, as well as the passion with which Mr.
Bergh compared Mary Ellen to an animal needing protection. Id. at 53–61. The fact that the media account
caught the fancy of the public and likely spurred the beginning of the movement to prevent child abuse is
the relevant point here. See id.
63. Id. at 53.
64. C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 61.
65. Id. at 64–70.
66. Id. at 67–70.
67. See id. at 66.
68. Id. at 74. Charles Loring Brace was also making headlines in the mid- to late-1800s as the head of
the New York Children’s Aid Society, which made a practice of placing homeless or destitute children
into homes of families as a form of indentured servitude. ASHBY , supra note 20, at 39–40. Brace thought
of the children he “helped” as a “‘happy race of little heathens and barbarians.’” Id. at 39.
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other important issues for women, children, and families were gaining
attention in America.69 Women’s suffrage, temperance, the
improvement of the place of women within the family, attempts to stop
or ameliorate domestic violence, and more were the focus for many
activists seeking change in patriarchal America.70 At the same time,
judicial patriarchy, mixed with the rise of Elbridge Gerry and Charles
Loring Brace and their patriarchal notions of combating child abuse by
targeting and splitting impoverished families, created an adversarial
relationship between families and the state.71 This was the tone
heading into the Progressive Era, when the government began to take
an active role in the prevention of child abuse.
2. The Progressive Reform Period: 1890–1920
In the late-1800s, the problem of child abuse started to receive more
attention from official governmental entities than it ever had.72 The
White House held the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children,
juvenile courts began to emerge around the country, and legislatures
began to pass laws to address problems of neglect, abuse, and child
delinquency.73 The attention on the problem was a positive shift from
the era when adults could abuse and neglect children, even murder
them, with few repercussions. But the change was not necessarily
entirely positive. For a multitude of reasons, like the private entities
fighting child abuse, the public institutions charged with addressing
the problem of child abuse and neglect could be hostile toward, and
judgmental of, families touched by abuse.74
When a state identified a child as “needy,” it commonly responded
by separating the child from the family, even if the child’s parents were
loving and committed to caring for their child.75 A general disdain for,
and apprehension of, people who lived in poverty caused society to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 74.
Id.
Id. at 62, 66, 74.
See A SHBY , supra note 20, at 79–84.
Id.
Id. at 79–80.
See id. at 82–83.
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view children born into households without substantial means as
neglected and delinquent, even if neither was true.76 Although those
who attended the White House Conference on the Care of Dependent
Children largely agreed that it was important to maintain and preserve
family units as much as possible, in reality, the opposite happened.77
Dependency, delinquency, abuse, and neglect were viewed as
essentially the same problems, and judges were likely to send children
to orphanages or foster care in order to “rescue” them, even if they
were not abused or neglected.78 The state’s intervention tended to be
as heavy handed as possible, without much regard for helping build
and preserve family autonomy.
Recognizing as flawed the system of removing children from their
parents’ custody when poverty was the only transgression,
progressives focused on issues of child welfare in the early 1900s
began to push for reforms that would allow children to stay with the
mothers struggling to care for them.79 The new system, providing
“mothers’ pensions” to women unable to make enough money to
provide for their children, was intended to keep families together.80
Progressives sought to depart from the routine practice of removing
children who were not abused or neglected from their impoverished
homes and instead provide enough financial assistance that their
mothers could feed and clothe them.81 Mothers’ pensions were a
popular policy shift for a short period of time, but they were illconceived and created new challenges for mothers trying to maintain
custody of their children.82 In reality, mothers’ pensions did little to
stop states from removing children from their mothers’ custody and
were more effective at reinforcing the notion that the state should step
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See A SHBY , supra note 20, at 82.
79. Id. at 94.
80. Id. at 94–98; MYERS, supra note 23, at 60 (“The first statewide laws authorizing mothers’ pensions
were passed in 1911 . . . . By 1920, forty states had mothers’ pension laws, and by 1935, nearly all states
had such laws.”).
81. ASHBY , supra note 20, at 94–97.
82. Id. at 96–97. Mothers’ pensions were often not large enough to allow a mother to stay at home
with her children full time, requiring her to work at least some portion of a week. Id. at 97. Doing so risked
her ability to keep her children because childcare was extremely difficult to obtain. Id.
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into the shoes of parents deemed “lesser than” for any number of
reasons.83
The paradigm shift away from viewing children as property of their
fathers toward protecting children from harm appears to have been
dramatic and widespread, affecting multiple levels of society.84 After
so many centuries of ignoring issues of child abuse and neglect, courts
were suddenly given broad power to save children from harm.85 Courts
took that mandate seriously and began to step into the role of parent
through the doctrine of parens patriae.86 The overriding belief at the
time was that the environment in which children were raised was the
dominating influence on the child’s behavior, so if a child was prone
to misbehaving, it was necessary for the court to intercede and remove
the child from the home.87 This dramatic swing, from the societal
belief that government’s role in family decision making should be
limited or nonexistent to the widespread acceptance of government
action severing families for apparently small transgressions, was
powerful and likely the cause of yet another paradigm shift at the end
of the Progressive Reform Period.
3. The Fall and Resurrection of Child Abuse Issue Recognition:
1920–1960
The goal of ending, or at least limiting, child abuse and neglect
seems like the kind of issue that is likely to be perceived as important,
no matter what political, legal, or policy challenges the country is
facing. But between 1920 and 1960, the issue of child abuse and
neglect faded into the background, leaving children largely ignored
once again.88 Positive change continued throughout this era, but the
83. See id. at 99–100.
84. See C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 46–48.
85. Id. at 48. The phrase parens patriae means “‘ultimate parent’ or ‘parent of the country.’” Ventrell,
supra note 21, at 66. “The courts accepted the logic that society was entitled to take custody of a child
without due process of law, regardless of his or her status as victim or offender, because of the state’s
authority and obligation to save its children from becoming criminal.” Id.
86. C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 48.
87. Id.
88. CORBY, supra note 14, at 26; C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 82; MYERS, supra note 23, at 79;
see generally C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 105 (1962). Dr. Henry
Kempe, a pediatrician, increased awareness in child abuse and neglect when he published a series of
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fervor surrounding the issue of “child saving” essentially died.89 There
are many potential reasons for this, including discord among groups
dedicated to eradicating child abuse and neglect, a refocus of the
feminist movement away from child saving and toward issues more
directly related to women, and, most importantly for the purposes of
this article, disillusionment with the juvenile courts.90 The juvenile
courts, once thought of as the answer to the problems of child abuse
and neglect, began to receive criticism about decisions they made and
how they made them.91
As stated above, juvenile courts often did not know how to make
the distinction between child neglect and child delinquency, which
resulted in wildly divergent decisions about how to help at-risk
children.92 Children who were neglected or whose parents had died
were routinely removed from whatever family they did have and
labeled delinquent or dependent at the whim of the judge.93 Judges did
not have much law to guide them, and little or no training in social
work, so their decisions about how to assist families in need were often
rudderless and inconsistent.94 Judges took control of every aspect of
abuse and neglect cases, including recruiting foster and adoptive
homes, placing children in those homes, and supervising the
placements.95 This judicial hyper-intervention marginalized social
work and further pushed the issues of child abuse and neglect into
public policy dormancy.96
Throughout the first 150 years of the nation’s existence, there was
no real clarity about how to treat the legal rights of parents and
children. It was not necessarily even clear that children had legal
rights, and if they did, to what extent they would be recognized and
articles that described the numerous incidents of child abuse he witnessed. CORBY, supra note 14, at 26–
27; see generally Henry Kempe et al., supra. Dr. Kempe and his associates ultimately coined the term
“battered child syndrome.” CORBY, supra note 14, at 26–27.
89. ASHBY, supra note 20, at 101.
90. C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 82–91.
91. Id. at 90–92.
92. See id.; Ventrell, supra note 21, at 67.
93. C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 91.
94. See id. at 91–92.
95. Id. at 91.
96. Id. at 92.
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protected. And when states started to pay attention to the problem of
child abuse and neglect, courts applied varying community standards
to parents who stood accused of abuse or neglect.97 The extreme
dichotomy in how the public viewed the rights of parents to raise their
children throughout America’s history highlighted how it could take
so long for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the issue. Even though
it was one of the first fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme
Court, the right of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their
children was not recognized until 55 years after the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification.98
C. Supreme Court Decisions About the Rights of Parents to Raise
Their Children
During the years leading to the modern view of how child abuse and
neglect should be addressed, courts grappled with determining the
appropriate level of governmental involvement in families’ lives and
which government entities should be responsible for the intervention.99
Few regulations, statutes, or common law cases defined or limited the
proper level of court intervention after an allegation of abuse or
neglect.100 Until the Supreme Court decided Meyer v. Nebraska in
1923, there was no jurisprudence regarding the constitutional rights of
parents to make decisions about how to raise their children.101 Not until
1974 did federal legislation exist to address the problem of child
abuse.102 And it was not until 1982 that the fundamental right of
parents to retain custody of their children was separately
acknowledged from the right to direct and control the upbringing of a

97. See generally MYERS, supra note 23.
98. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923).
99. See Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV . J. ON L EGIS. 1, 13–20 (2001).
100. See C OSTIN ET AL ., supra note 33, at 89–92.
101. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children . . . .”).
102. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2006)); see Adler, supra note 99, at 17–18.
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child.103
1. The Constitutional Right to Make Parenting Decisions
As is often true in any constitutional doctrine, the Court has
considered many avenues of parenting rights throughout its history.
The Court has determined that persons have a constitutional right to
choose to avoid parenthood.104 A parent’s constitutional right to keep
a family together,105 to make educational and religious decisions for a
child,106 and to retain the custody of a child107 have all been decided
by the Court. The bases for those rights have been found mostly in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses.108 The two most important pieces of the rights to parent for
the purposes of this article are the right to custody and the right to
direct and control the upbringing of a child, both of which have been
addressed separately by the Court, and at times, have been conflated
into one all-encompassing “right to parent.”109
The right to parent has been broken into what can be viewed as two
lanes of a highway heading in the same direction. In one lane, a parent
has the right to the custody of her children, although that right can be
limited or terminated when there is proof that the parent is neglectful,
abusive, or somehow harmful to the child.110 In the other lane, a parent
has a right to say how she would like to raise her children, i.e., how to
feed them, teach them, clothe them, expose them to religious
education, and so on.111 Of course, those rights can be curtailed or
103. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
104. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992) (striking a requirement that married women ask permission from their husbands
before obtaining an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
105. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977).
106. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
107. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126–30 (1989); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972).
108. See cases cited supra notes 104–07.
109. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
110. See, e.g., In re Emily, 540 S.E.2d 542, 553 (W. Va. 2000).
111. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
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terminated in light of abuse or neglect as well.112 The distinction can
be significant if the parents of children are not living in the same
household and disagree about when either party should have the
children and how the children should be raised. These concepts are
broken into two pieces that courts consider when deciding custody
disputes—physical and legal custody.113
In the context of a parent’s right to retain custody of a child when
there has been a claim of abuse or neglect or when a parent loses
custody of a child based on the prior loss of custody of another child,
however, the two rights cannot be disentangled. When the state
removes children from their parents’ custody, it also removes parents’
right to direct and control the upbringing of their child. The separation
of the two rights in this context is not possible or relevant; in order to
analyze the importance of the fundamental rights of parents, the right
to custody and to the ability to control a child’s upbringing must be
considered together.
Before the Court announced the fundamental right to parent, it
developed several lines of case law that delineated particular parental
rights. The Court, however, seemed to avoid acknowledging these
rights as fundamental liberty interests for many decades after the
Court’s first foray into the area.114 The wait for a clear declaration of
the constitutional right to parent ended in 1982, when the Supreme
Court definitively, affirmatively, and clearly stated that parents have a
fundamental constitutional right to direct and control the upbringing
of their children.115 According to the Court in Santosky v. Kramer,
parents have a fundamental due process liberty interest to the custody,
care, and control of their children.116 Although the fundamental liberty
interest was perhaps not plainly articulated until the early 1980s, the
Court has since made clear that the right is one of the most
112. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374–75 (Utah 1982) (“[W]e conclude that . . . a parent [can]not . . . be
deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect . . . .”).
113. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., C ONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 743–45 (3d ed. 2012)
(discussing the differences between physical custody and legal custody in the context of joint parenting
arrangements).
114. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
115. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
116. Id.
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foundational fundamental rights in the Constitution.117 The importance
of the existence of the broad right cannot be underestimated, and the
Court’s reticence to recognize it through the substantive due process
rights lens perhaps led to many decades of thin protection of parents’
rights in custody proceedings. Only if there were procedural due
process or equal protection problems with the way a state interfered
with the right to parent could parents challenge the loss of their
parental rights with constitutional backing.
Not long after juvenile courts began to slip out of favor and the
issues of child abuse and neglect faded from the priority list of child
welfare activists, the Supreme Court took its first steps at recognizing
the fundamental right of parents to raise their children.118 Before
Meyer, the Supreme Court had never acknowledged that parents had
any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to parent their children.119
The Court’s inclusion of the right in a long list of other fundamental
rights, such as the right “to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, [and] to marry,”
seemed to indicate the Court believed it to be an uncontroversial right
to enumerate.120 Of course, the right to marry, also included in the list,
was far from settled as a fundamental right until the Court decided, in
Loving v. Virginia, that state laws barring interracial marriage violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.121 As with the Court’s continued analysis
of the fundamental right to marry over the many years between Meyer
v. Nebraska and Loving v. Virginia, the jurisprudence about the right
to parent continued to evolve as well.
The Supreme Court appeared to identify, for the first time, the
117. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. The Court actually stated that the fundamental liberty interest of parents to
the care, custody, and control of their children is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized” by the Court and cites to Meyer v. Nebraska in support of that proposition. Id. As discussed,
infra, the Court did not, until much later, make as clear as Justice O’Connor suggested in the majority
opinion of Troxel that the liberty interests of parents are fundamental.
118. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)
(acknowledging the power of the legislature over the institution of marriage and stating that marriage is
the “most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than
any other institution”). Obviously, the ongoing debate over same-sex marriage keeps questions alive
regarding to what extent marriage is truly a fundamental right under the Constitution.
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fundamental right of parents to make decisions about how to educate
their children with Meyer v. Nebraska and continued to shape the right
in the following years. Having the power to decide how a child will be
educated may have implied a more encompassing constitutional right
for parents to raise their children, but Meyer did not definitively
answer the question of whether parents have a fundamental due
process right to raise their children.122 While Meyer is regarded as the
first case that spoke to the rights of parents to raise their children, the
issue before the Court was not whether parents had a fundamental right
to direct and control the upbringing of their children.123 In Meyer, the
issue before the Court was the criminal conviction of a teacher who
taught German to a student in violation of Nebraska law.124 The Court
attempted to define, if loosely, the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s prohibition on government deprivation of “‘life, liberty
or property without due process of law.’”125
The Court offered a list of liberties that must be guaranteed under
the broad dictates of the law.126 Included on the list were rights to
“acquire useful knowledge,” the right to marry, the right to “establish
a home and bring up children,” and more.127 The Court then focused
the reasoning for its decision to overturn Mr. Meyer’s conviction on
the “supreme importance” of the acquisition of knowledge and
education, as well as the right of parents to control and educate their
children.128 The right of a parent to raise a child, while on the list of
rights that the Due Process Clause protects from undue government
interference, was not specifically part of the Court’s reasoning for
overturning the conviction of Mr. Meyer.129 It would appear the notion
122. Romana Kaleem, Comment, Towards the Recognition of a Parental Right of Companionship in
Adult Children Under the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1121, 1131 (2005) (“One of the first cases that dealt with familial substantive due process rights,
Meyer v. Nebraska, recognized the right of a parent to control the upbringing of his or her children.”
(footnote omitted)).
123. Id.
124. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396–97.
125. Id. at 399.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 400–01.
129. See generally id.
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that parental rights were protected by the Due Process Clause was, at
this point in the Court’s jurisprudence, dicta.
The Court’s assertion, albeit perhaps legally weak, that the Due
Process Clause protected a person’s right to “establish a home and
bring up children” continued seeping into other areas of the parentchild relationship. Two years after deciding Meyer v. Nebraska, in
1925, the Court decided Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, which also addressed parents’ rights to
make educational decisions for their children.130 This time the issue
was whether an Oregon statute that required parents to send their
children to public school complied with the Due Process Clause.131
The two appellees, Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
and Mary and Hill Military Academy, were not parents seeking rights
to direct and control the upbringing and education of their children.132
Again, the Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of an issue
that only indirectly affected the rights of parents.133
The Court was faced with deciding whether the appellees, who were
corporations whose purpose was to educate children, could assert a due
process right to protect their property interests in their schools and
businesses.134 The Court held the Constitution protected their property
interests and ruled the lower court decision in favor of the appellees
should stand.135 The lower court held several things, including that
appellees had a protected property right in conducting their schools,
which could not be invaded without due process of law.136 Primarily,
the lower court reasoned that the liberty interest at stake held by the
schools prohibited improper state interference with their right to
operate.137 Though finding that “in the proper sense” corporations
cannot claim a liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
130. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
131. Id. at 529–31, 534.
132. Id. at 531–33; see generally Soc’y of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928 (D. Or. 1924), aff’d, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
133. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531–33; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398–99.
134. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535–36.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 533–34.
137. See Soc’y of Sisters, 296 F. at 936–38.
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Supreme Court nevertheless agreed with the lower court’s reasoning
that the “right to conduct schools was property and that parents and
guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the education of
children by selecting reputable teachers and places.”138
The Court then set the Pierce decision squarely atop the decision in
Meyer v. Nebraska, stating that it would rely upon the “doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska” to reason that the statute in question interfered
with the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”139 The Pierce Court did not
mention that Meyer was a case between a teacher and the state about
his criminal conviction for teaching material he had a constitutional
right to teach.140 The Pierce Court’s mention of Meyer was in the
context of what it called a “doctrine” in Meyer that protected the liberty
of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their children.141
Even though Pierce also did not directly confront the issue of parents’
constitutional rights to raise their children, history has focused on the
decision as a parents’ rights decision, not a schools’ rights decision.142
So, the Supreme Court appeared to have splashed loudly into the
relatively calm fundamental substantive due process rights water when
it recognized the constitutional rights of parents in two cases that
involved no parent litigants at all.
The Court recognized a person’s constitutional right to be treated
equally under the law and not subject to forced sterilization in 1942
with its decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.143 The Court struck an
Oklahoma statute requiring persons who had two or more “moral
turpitude” felony convictions to be sterilized because the requirement

138. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447 F.3d 1187, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Brad J.
Davidson, Comment, Balancing Parental Choice, State Interest, and the Establishment Clause:
Constitutional Guidelines for States’ School-Choice Legislation, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 445 (2002)
(“Meyer and Pierce are recognized as the seminal cases declaring the constitutional right of parents to
direct the education and upbringing of their children.”); Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in
History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 92 (2010).
143. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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violated the Equal Protection Clause.144 Because the act characterized
some felonies, such as robbery, as crimes of “moral turpitude” but not
other felonies, such as embezzlement, the Court held that the statute
could not survive equal protection scrutiny.145 Targeting certain types
of, but not all, felonious behavior as so morally repugnant that the
perpetrator must be barred from procreating was a clear violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.146 But, the Court declined to declare that
persons have a fundamental right to procreation.
The Petitioner challenged the Oklahoma statute on several
constitutional grounds, including the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.147 The Court explicitly refused to decide the
case on those grounds and instead focused on the inequities on the face
of the statute.148 The Court did acknowledge the depth of importance
of “one of the basic civil rights of man[,]” that is, the right to
procreate.149 And, even though the Court went on to say that
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race[,]” it refrained from declaring procreation as a
fundamental right that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.150
Although there are obvious distinctions between the right to procreate
and the right to raise a child, in the overwhelming majority of
instances, one flows naturally and appropriately into the other, and a
declaration of procreation as a fundamental constitutional right in
Skinner may have given lower courts a much earlier clarification on
how much deference to parents’ rights the Constitution affords.
Marching forward in its flirtation with fundamental parental rights,
the Court next considered Prince v. Massachusetts in 1944.151 The
Court characterized the case as yet “another episode in the conflict
between Jehovah’s Witnesses and state authority[,]” which required
review of state authority to invade a person’s exercise of her religious
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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convictions.152 The issue of parental rights was implicated by the facts
in the case; namely, that Sarah Prince was distributing religious
material in the evening with her nine-year-old charge, Betty Simmons,
for whom Ms. Prince served as a guardian, in violation of several
Massachusetts child labor laws.153 The Court considered Ms. Prince’s
arguments that the statute forbidding child labor was invalid because
it violated the child’s, Miss Betty Simmons, First Amendment rights
to religious freedom and because it violated Ms. Prince’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to parent Miss Betty Simmons.154 The Court treaded
carefully into the analysis of the overlapping constitutional interests
here, those of a citizen’s freedom of religion as well as a parent’s right
to parent.
The Court started with the discussion of whether a constitutional
right to parent, particularly in the context of allowing a child to
exercise her religious freedoms, can be invaded by the state.155 And
while the Court determined that such an invasion was proper in narrow
circumstances to protect children, it discussed the care states should
use when considering treading on parental rights in the context of
religious practice: “On one side is the obviously earnest claim for
freedom of conscience and religious practice. With it is allied the
parent’s claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing of
her children.”156 The Court did not stray far from the consideration of
a parent’s right to direct and control the religious upbringing of her
child and chose to consider the more narrow issue rather than fully
commit the Court to the broader proposition that parents have
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their
children.157 And in this case, the Court ultimately decided that Ms.
Prince’s right as a guardian to decide how to allow her charge to
practice her religion could be trumped by the child labor laws at
issue.158 And so, the question of whether parents had a fundamental
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 159–60, 162.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
Id.
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–67.
See id. at 170–71.
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right to raise their children continued to remain unanswered.
The Court considered many other challenges by parents to the
authority of the state to dictate their parental rights after Prince v.
Massachusetts. In some cases, the Court protected parents from
unconstitutional interference by the state, and in others like Prince, the
Court permitted the state to draw lines with respect to how parents
were permitted to raise their children.159 The line of cases that
extended from the Court’s first foray into delimiting parents’ rights in
Meyer v. Nebraska focused on the limits of parents’ power to make
decisions about how to raise their children. The most recent case where
the Court was asked to determine the constitutional rights in the
context of parents’ rights to make parenting decisions came in 2000,
when it decided a case about the rights of third parties to seek court
ordered visitation with children.
In Troxel v. Granville, the paternal grandparents of two children
sought to increase the amount of time they spent with their
grandchildren after their son, the father of the children, committed
suicide.160 The grandparents relied on a Washington state law that gave
third parties the right to seek visitation with any child with whom they
wanted to spend time.161 The Court reviewed the constitutionality of
the law in light of its earlier declaration in Santosky v. Kramer, in
which the Court recognized that parents have a fundamental right to
retain the custody of their children unless the state can show clear and
convincing evidence that the right should be invaded.162 The Court in
Troxel applied the strict fundamental right standard and struck the
Washington statute as impermissibly stepping on the parent’s
constitutional right to the care and control of her children.163 The Court
held that, in giving the right to third parties to seek visitation,
Washington had created standing in court for any individual to
159. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
160. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 66. See infra Part I.C.2. Santosky was the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized
a fundamental parental right; in that case it was the right of parents to retain custody of their children.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
163. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73.
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interfere with a parent’s right to decide with whom her children can
spend time.164
Troxel was the first case to declare that parents’ rights to the care
and control of their children are fundamental.165 Santosky, which was
decided eighteen years earlier, focused on the question of whether a
parent’s custodial rights could be terminated at a low evidentiary
standard and was less about how the parents in the case parented their
children.166 Of course, underneath every decision about whether a
parent should retain custody is a question of the parent’s ability to care
for and control his or her child. The cases about the care and control
of children, on the other hand, do not necessarily require an analysis
of whether it is appropriate for the parent to retain custody.167 Perhaps
the cases about parents’ rights to direct and control the upbringing of
their children were not perceived high stakes enough to warrant a
discussion by the Court about fundamental rights, but the statute at
issue in Troxel finally pushed the Court over, in the context of parents’
rights to direct and control their children, that fundamental rights edge.
The Court in Troxel may not have recognized its predecessor
Courts’ reticence to call the rights of parents to direct and control their
children a fundamental right, or it may not have wanted to
acknowledge how long it took to officially name the right, but either
way, the Court in Troxel stated that parents’ rights have been
recognized as fundamental for a lot longer than perhaps was
accurate.168 The Troxel majority deftly weaved fundamental liberty
language into its discussion of the precedent:
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, we held that
164. Id.
165. See id. at 65.
166. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–70.
167. All of the cases in this Section are about parents’ rights to make decisions regarding their children’s
educational opportunities or religious upbringing. Those cases were not analyzed as situations in which
abuse or neglect were at issue.
168. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66.
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the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and
“to control the education of their own.”169

Regardless of the Court’s reasoning for waiting so long to officially
recognize the right, and regardless of the Court’s reasoning for its
retroactive recognition of the right, the Court had finally declared it.
When parents’ rights are at stake, either custodial or the rights to direct
and control their children’s upbringing, the states must take great care
to avoid unconstitutional interference with them. And even though it
was recognized first, parents’ fundamental right to retain custody of
their children had its own somewhat difficult path to fruition.
2. The Constitutional Right to Retain Custody
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County,
N.C.,170 the Court was asked to determine whether the protections for
criminal defendants in the Due Process Clause to have assistance of
counsel when their freedom was at stake extended to parents at risk of
losing their parental rights.171 The Court recognized an important
interest in the rights of parents to the custody of their children,172 but
stopped short of drawing a direct comparison of those rights to the
rights of criminal defendants at risk of losing their personal freedom.173
And even though the Court acknowledged the importance of the right
to parent in that context, the Court stopped short of stating directly that
parents have fundamental rights to parent under the Due Process
Clause.174 It was not until a year later, in Santosky v. Kramer, that the
Court was willing to make that declaration. In Santosky, the Court was
asked to consider the constitutionality of the evidentiary standards
applied when adjudicating parents’ right to custody, and in that

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.
See id. at 31–32.
See generally id.
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context, the Court finally declared the fundamental right to parent.175
Santosky afforded the Court the opportunity to clarify the
evidentiary standard used to determine whether parents should retain
custody of their children.176 Before then, the standard fluctuated from
state to state because each allegation of child abuse or neglect
presented unique facts that were then applied to different legal
standards.177 It has always been within the states’ purview to determine
what constitutes proper parenting according to community
standards.178 What the Court eventually ruled constitutionally
impermissible, however, was the lack of consistency among the
evidentiary standards states applied to each adjudication of allegations
of parental misconduct.179
In Santosky, the Court articulated clearly, for the first time, the
evidentiary standard required by the Due Process Clause to terminate
parental rights.180 The parents in Santosky, John and Annie Santosky,
were accused of parental neglect of one of their children, Tina, who
was removed from their home.181 Ten months later, their son, John was
also removed from the home, which also happened to be the same day
Annie Santosky gave birth to another son, Jed.182 When Jed was three
days old, he was transferred to a foster home upon allegations that his
175. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 753 (1982).
176. Id.
177. Some states adopted the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., In re C.G., 637 P.2d 66, 70–71
(Okla. 1981) (“The clear-and-convincing standard balances the parents’ fundamental freedom from family
disruption with the state’s duty to protect children within its borders. It places an appropriately heavy
burden upon the . . . petitioner (termination-seeking party) to overcome the law’s policy which identifies
the child’s best interest with that of its natural parents.”). But cf. Custody of Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 74–
75 (Mass. 1979). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly rejected the clear and
convincing standard. Id. Instead, the court followed an approach that provided the judge discretion when
weighing the evidence. Id. (“We think it undesirable, however, to adopt the mother’s suggestion that we
require ‘clear and convincing’ proof in cases of the kind presented here . . . We prefer to take the position
that the personal rights . . . require the judge to exercise the utmost care in promulgating custody awards.”).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (“Both theory and the precedents of
this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family . . . .”); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways.”).
179. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–70.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 751.
182. Id.
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life would be in imminent danger if he were permitted to stay with his
parents.183 After an adjudication hearing where the judge applied a
“fair preponderance of the evidence” standard to the question of
whether the Santoskys were fit parents, the judge terminated their
parental rights.184
The Supreme Court took the case on appeal to determine whether
the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard satisfied the Due
Process Clause and adequately protected parents from state
interference with their rights to custody.185 The Court then clearly
stated, for the first time, that the rights of parents to “freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life” was a “fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”186 The Court went
on to say that the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to the State.”187 Interestingly, the
Court in Santosky, for the first time, wrapped parents’ rights to the
care, control, and maintenance of their children together with their
right to retain custody of their children. It seems that the increased
level of severity of the termination of parental rights gave the Court
the opportunity to articulate that a fundamental right to parent exists.
The Court reasoned that when parents have lost custody of their
children to the state pending termination proceedings, the standards to
protect their constitutional rights are even more important than those
at stake for parents who are subject to state scrutiny for their parenting
but have retained their custody rights.188 These considerations are
crucial to keep in mind when discussing the current regime
encouraging rapid termination of parental rights.189
Based on the facts of Santosky, the Court did not need to include in
183. Id.
184. Id. at 751–52.
185. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749–52.
186. Id. at 753.
187. Id.
188. Id. (“If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical
need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.”).
189. See infra Part III.
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its recognition that parents have fundamental rights to direct and
control the upbringing of their children.190 The higher stakes in
Santosky could have been distinguished from the earlier parents’ rights
cases because the Santoskys’ parental rights had been terminated.191 In
Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and other cases preceding Santosky, the Court
was asked to determine whether the state could dictate how parents
raise their children, not whether they should be allowed to raise them
at all.192 Once a fundamental right to custody was declared, however,
it presumably would have been very difficult to disentangle the
obviously interwoven considerations of parents’ rights to manage the
upbringing of their children.
Of particular importance, when analyzing how the fundamental
right to parent can be invaded by the state, is the Court’s decision to
apply the strict “clear and convincing evidence” standard for
terminating parental rights.193 The Santosky Court looked closely at
the process used by the State of New York to permanently terminate
parental rights and determined that evaluating the case on a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard provided inadequate due
process.194 The Court, however, declined to require that states prove
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that parental rights should be terminated,
as is required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).195
Congress reasoned that an Indian parent’s rights to parent his or her
child should not be permanently severed without evidence showing the
termination was necessary “beyond a reasonable doubt.”196
Congress, in passing the ICWA, reasoned that the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard was necessary because
terminating parental rights “‘is a penalty as great [as], if not greater,
than a criminal penalty.’”197 In the years before Congress passed the
190. See generally Santosky, 455 U.S. 745.
191. Id. at 751.
192. See supra notes 118–25, 130–33, 151–58 and accompanying text.
193. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70.
194. Id. at 768.
195. Id. at 750–51, 768–70.
196. See id. at 750–51.
197. Id. at 769 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7545).
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ICWA, an epidemic of hyper-interventionism was gripping child
protection authorities on Native American reservations.198 When the
parental rights of Native Americans were terminated (often for flimsy
reasons that could not satisfy even a low standard of proof), their
Native American children were placed with, and often adopted by,
non-Native families living off the reservation.199 This practice was so
common and percentages of children leaving the reservation
permanently so high that activists called upon Congress to
intervene.200 In hopes of preserving the culture of Native Americans,
Congress changed the standard of proof for terminating parental rights
to the highest there is, beyond a reasonable doubt, and made it very
difficult to remove children from reservations.201 The standard of proof
for non-Native American parental rights termination, however,
remains the less demanding clear and convincing evidence.202
The concern for preserving cultural integrity on Indian reservations
was real and Congress addressed that concern, in part, by requiring a
strict standard of proof to terminate parental rights of Native American
parents.203 Congress justified its actions in passing the stricter standard
by stating, in legislative history, that losing parental rights can be as
punishing as (or perhaps more than) criminal penalties.204 The
motivation to evaluate the standard of proof applied to Native
American parents at risk of losing their parental rights was rooted in
the concern about cultural bias against Native parents, which was
198. See Cheyañna L. Jaffke, Judicial Indifference: Why Does the “Existing Indian Family” Exception
to the Indian Child Welfare Act Continue to Endure?, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2011); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (“Surveys of states with large Indian populations conducted by the
Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) in 1969 and again in 1974 indicate that approximately
25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive
homes, or institutions.”).
199. Jaffke, supra note 198, at 130. ICWA’s congressional findings state that “an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012).
200. Sarah Martinez, Turning Back the Clock: The Loss of Tribal Jurisdiction Over Involuntary
Juvenile Dependency Proceedings, 10 U. C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 541, 541–42 (2006).
201. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
202. Brian C. Hill, Comment, The State’s Burden of Proof at the Best Interests Stage of a Termination
of Parental Rights, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 557, 559 (2004).
203. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3), 1912(f); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22.
204. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22.
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appropriate and necessary.205 The absence of the motivation to stem
cultural family destruction, however, does not change how stiff the
penalty of losing parental rights can be. If the loss of parental rights is
a heavy burden for Native American parents to bear, it is an equally
heavy burden for all parents to bear.
Perhaps the context of the shockingly high rate of parental rights
terminations of Native American parents and adoptions of children
from Indian reservations provided a unique lens through which
Congress could view parental rights. Instead of evaluating the process
of parental rights termination from the perspective of children believed
to be at risk, Congress was forced to evaluate the process through the
eyes of the parents faced with losing their children to the state and then
to strangers. That context may have spurred Congress to take decisive
action to protect parents’ rights, which is not often the path Congress
follows when considering legislation that affects parents and children.
Despite its rightful concern for procedural safeguards for Native
American parental rights, Congress has prioritized procedures that
value efficiency and finality over careful consideration and protection
of parental rights for all other parents. This congressional drive for
efficiency culminated most recently in the Adoption and Safe Families
Act, which has, over the sixteen years since its enactment, encouraged
states to speed their procedures for parental rights termination to
constitutionally impermissible rates.206
II. ATTEMPTS BY CONGRESS AND THE STATES TO SEEK PERMANENCE
FOR CHILDREN WHO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR PARENTS’
CUSTODY
The evolution of a balance between protecting children from
abusive parents and protecting parents from undue state interference
with their right to parent, may have reached equilibrium sometime
205. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 661–62 (2002).
206. Mary O’Flynn, Comment, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child Welfare
Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 243, 265
(1999).
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around the time Santosky v. Kramer was decided by the Supreme Court
in 1982. At that point, the problems of child abuse and neglect were
well known and acknowledged at every level of government and were
addressed in legislation in every state, albeit with varying success rates
of saving children from horrible home situations.207 Also, as discussed
in Section I.C.2., supra, the Supreme Court recognized that the
solution to the problem of child abuse could not include
unconstitutional intervention.208 Of course, many may disagree that
there ever was, or could ever be, equilibrium when it comes to
balancing children’s and parents’ rights, but if it existed at all in the
early 1980s, it was about to come to an end. In 1997, Congress passed
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, which not only made it more
difficult for parents accused of abuse or neglect to retain or regain
custody of their children but also put children at increased risk of
psychological harm by removing them from perhaps imperfect, but
ultimately better than the alternative (orphan status), homes.209
A. The Purpose Behind the Adoption and Safe Families Act
In passing the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), Congress
intended to “promote the adoption of children in foster care.”210
Congress was concerned with statistics indicating that children who
are placed in foster care because their parents were accused of abuse
or neglect were spending significant portions of their childhood in the
foster care system and sought to expedite the process of terminating
parental rights to free those children for adoption.211 Children in foster
care before ASFA could be hanging in the balance between their
parents and a permanent placement with an adoptive family for an
extended period of time, sometimes for years.212 A lack of permanence
for those children was considered extremely detrimental to them and
207. Laura Oren, The State’s Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: Deshaney in
Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 666–67 (1990).
208. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
209. See O’Flynn, supra note 206, at 251, 265.
210. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
211. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740, 1997 WL 225672.
212. Id. at 8–9.
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studies showed that the uncertainty of their situation could cause great
anxiety and frustration among foster children.213 The negative impacts
of being in limbo for a long time were considered damaging enough to
outweigh the potential benefits of eventually reuniting children with
their rehabilitated parents.214
In passing ASFA, Congress placed a significant emphasis on cutting
the amount of time it takes for states to terminate parental rights of
biological or legal parents and free children for adoption.215 A
necessary first step to reducing the amount of time children spend in
foster care is to sever the rights of their parents, permanently cutting
off parents’ rights to legal and physical custody of their children. Once
parental rights are terminated, courts may freely finalize adoptions of
children who are fortunate enough to have prospective adoptive
parents.216 The purpose behind, and the language in, ASFA aims to
expedite the process of parental rights termination so as to give those
prospective adoptive parents a clear opportunity to move forward with
adoption.217 More importantly, the aim is to give children in the foster
care system a sense of stability by securing permanent placements for
them as quickly as possible.218
B. How ASFA Works
Congress intended for ASFA to provide a set of statutory principles
213. See O’Flynn, supra note 206, at 251. In H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, the Ways and Means Committee
stated that “[t]here seems to be almost universal agreement that adoption is preferable to foster care and
that the nation’s children would be well served by a policy that increases adoption rates.” H.R. REP. NO.
105-77, at 8.
214. See generally Lenore M. McWey & Ann K. Mullins, Improving the Lives of Children in Foster
Care: The Impact of Supervised Visitation, FAM. REL., Apr. 2004, at 293–300. The study examined
children ages from birth to eighteen that were placed in a foster care facility. Id. at 295. The study
concluded that “for families in which reunification is a goal, young children who have more consistent
and frequent contact with their biological parents have more secure attachments and are better adjusted
than children who have less contact.” Id. at 297; accord Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales
from the Age of ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 136–41 (2001) (summarizing studies that indicate
family preservation is superior to foster care).
215. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 13.
216. See id. at 23.
217. See id. at 8 (“[W]hat is needed is a measured response to allow States to adjust their statutes and
practices so that in some circumstances States will be able to move more efficiently toward terminating
parental rights and placing children for adoption.”).
218. See id.
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that states can implement for the reward of federal grant dollars.219 It
requires that states seek approval of their plan by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.220 The Secretary will ensure that the
state’s plan complies with ASFA requirements before the state can
receive any funding under the statute, meaning states must devise
procedures to ensure that state child welfare agencies move forward
with permanency planning within twelve months after children are
removed from their homes and placed in foster care.221 While the
scheme provides a possibility for extension of the permanency
planning stage, doing so can only be achieved if the state documents a
compelling reason for extension of temporary placement.222 And in
some circumstances, states are not required to wait even twelve months
to seek permanency planning.223 States that delay the process of
achieving permanency for children in the foster care system are at risk
of losing federal grant money in the future.224
The provisions of ASFA essentially have encouraged states to
truncate the process of evaluating parental fitness. It does so in two
ways. First, in the permanency planning provision, it seeks to shorten
the amount of time states are required to make reasonable efforts to
reunify children in foster care with their parents.225 Second, in certain
circumstances, the reasonable efforts provision exception seeks to
eliminate altogether the reasonable efforts requirement and shortens
the time the state must wait to seek termination of parental rights to
thirty days.226 The permanency planning provision is not as restrictive
as the exception to the reasonable efforts requirement, but it did seek
to shorten the amount of time children spent in foster care, thereby
limiting the amount of time parents had to show that they could
conform to community standards of “good parenting.”
219. See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a).
221. Id. § 675(5)(C).
222. Id.
223. Id. § 671(a)(15)(C).
224. See id. § 671(a)(1)-(33).
225. Id. § 671(a)(15)(C).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E).
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1. Expedited Permanency Planning Under ASFA
The permanency planning provision of ASFA requires that states
make a definitive move toward permanency for a child who has been
in foster care for twelve months.227 At that point, the court must make
a determination about whether the child should be placed back with
his or her parents or whether the parents’ parental rights should be
terminated.228 The provision does permit a court to continue the foster
care relationship for some period of time if there are special
circumstances that warrant the continuation.229 It is clear from the
language and construction of the provision, though, that the possibility
of extending the time in foster care for a child is not desirable and
should be exercised rarely.230 In the twelve months between the child’s
placement in foster care and the permanency hearing, the state is
required to make reasonable efforts to “preserve and reunify” the
family.231
The reasonable efforts provision in ASFA is fairly short, but it
makes clear that the state cannot ignore reunification as a goal for
families who have been separated by abuse or neglect.232 The provision
requires that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify
families[,]” before or after the child has been removed from the
home.233 But if those reasonable efforts are deemed inconsistent with
the permanency plan set by the court for whatever reason, then the state
must shift its reasonable efforts to those that would advance the
finalization of the permanency plan.234 Reasonable efforts to preserve
and unify families are only required as long as the court deems them
consistent with the permanency plan.235 It is possible, then, that a
permanency plan that is established within twelve months of the
child’s placement into foster care could be deemed inconsistent with
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. § 675(5)(C).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 671(15)(B); O’Flynn, supra note 206, at 247.
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(B).
Id. § 671(15)(B)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 671(15)(C).
Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/1

38

Fershee: The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of Severing Parent

2014]UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF SEVERING PARENTAL RIGHTS 677

reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and at that point, the state is
free to move forward as quickly as it can to sever family ties
completely.236
In this scenario, it is quite possible for a parent to lose rights to her
child in the time span of twelve months. In twelve short months, a
parent struggling enough to lose custody of her child must make
significant improvements in her quality of life, including possibly
ending an addiction, getting job training and employment, learning and
implementing parenting skills (in the absence of having a child to
parent), and perhaps much more. Not only must she do those things,
she must do them to such a degree she can prove to a court that she is
a good candidate to retain parental rights to her children and in only a
short while after she has lost them. This task may prove
insurmountable to someone who has many of the tools it takes to be a
good parent but is struggling with only one of the life challenges that
can confront parents from time to time. And though this provision may
create a process that is so rushed it cannot pass procedural due process
muster, the reasonable efforts exceptions are even more problematic.
2. Exception to Reasonable Efforts to Reunify a Family
In drafting ASFA, Congress was not content to only encourage
states to significantly speed the process of terminating parental rights
in light of accusations of abuse and neglect. Congress went one step
further by including exceptions to the reasonable efforts requirements,
allowing states to skip altogether the process of assisting at-risk
parents and children to stay together.237 This provision permits states,
in certain enumerated circumstances, to forego any reasonable efforts
to reunify the family and move to permanency planning within thirty
days of determining that the reasonable efforts exception has been
triggered.238 The exception specifically enumerates several
circumstances in which reasonable efforts are not required.239 Several
236.
237.
238.
239.
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of the categories may seem logical and necessary to most, but at least
one is unconstitutionally efficient.
Under ASFA, the state is not required to make reasonable efforts to
reunite a parent with her child in three circumstances.240 First,
reasonable efforts are not required if the parent has subjected the child
to aggravated circumstances as defined by state law, though ASFA
suggests to include “abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual
abuse.”241 Additionally, a state can forego reasonable efforts if a parent
has committed murder, attempted murder, or felony assault of the child
or the child’s sibling.242 In the third category, the state may skip
reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and child if the “parental rights
of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.”243 It is
this category of exception to the reasonable efforts rule that most
clearly flies in the face of the Due Process Clause.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS OF STATE LAWS EXPEDITING
TERMINATION OF RIGHTS
In the years since ASFA was passed, states have fallen in line by
passing and implementing their own versions of the statute.244
Incentives in hand, states have been busily relying on statutes to
expedite the process of seeking permanence for children in foster care
by terminating parental rights at a faster pace than before ASFA.245
There have been other problems identified with the passage of ASFA
240. Id.
241. Id. § 671(15)(D)(i).
242. Id. § 671(15)(D)(ii).
243. Id. § 671(15)(D)(iii).
244. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sess.); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-5 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Extraordinary Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.414 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 130th Gen. Assembly).
245. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J.
LEGIS. 239, 269–75 (2002). Baldwin looked at all parental termination cases in St. Josephs County,
Indiana and found that there were more parental terminations after the passage of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act. Id. at 273–75. A magistrate judge in Michigan wrote a piece that included empirical
evidence showing the unintended negative results of ASFA and accompanying state legislation passed to
expedite the termination of parental rights: a spike in the number of state-created orphans with few or no
adoption prospects. Kenneth L. Tacoma, Lost and Alone on Some Forgotten Highway: ASFA, Binsfeld,
and the Law of Unintended Consequences 1–2 (Dec. 2005), http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/
OfficesPrograms/Documents/fcrb/Tacoma.pdf.
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that have arisen since states adopted versions of it, including creating
a whole new class of orphans and teenagers who need to be legally
emancipated and find a way to live on their own.246 But the most
pressing constitutional problem with the statute has been the interplay
between state practices for removing newborns from their parents’
custody within days of birth if the parents have previously lost parental
rights to a sibling of the newborn.247 Coupled with the general
expedited process to terminate parental rights, ASFA has essentially
incentivized states to sever the rights of these parents with far less than
the constitutionally required clear and convincing evidence standard.
A. Expedited Process of Parental Rights Termination After a Prior
Involuntary Termination
The exception in ASFA allowing states to forego reasonable
reunification efforts for parents who have previously lost rights to
another child is the second of three steps that end in an unconstitutional
process for persons falling into a somewhat common parental rights
termination scenario. The first step starts in the hospital when a mother
who has lost parental rights before gives birth. In many states, when a
mother already divested of rights to one child gives birth to another,
the state is notified of the birth.248 In these cases, before the mother is
permitted to leave the hospital, the state removes the newborn from her
custody on the assumption that the earlier adjudication terminating her
parental rights requires the newborn be protected from his or her

246. Tacoma, supra note 245, at 3–4.
247. See infra note 248.
248. See, e.g., Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1991)
(“[T]wo days after W.L.P. was born, HRS filed a petition for detention of W.L.P. based on the fact that
Mary Padgett 1) had recently given birth to a child who was placed in HRS custody . . . .”); In re T.T.:
S.T. v. Harrison Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 90 So. 3d 1283, 1284 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (“On August
5, 2010, DHS received an alert of potential abuse from Biloxi Regional Hospital stating S.T. was in the
hospital to give birth to a child. The hospital had received an alert from the Mobile, Alabama, Department
of Human Resources (DHR) stating S.T. had two other children already in the custody of DHR, and DHR
felt it was important for the newborn to be safe and free from abuse. On August 8, 2010, DHS picked up
T.T. . . . from the hospital and placed him in foster care.”); In re West, No. 05CA4, 2005 WL 1400029,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2005) (“On September 27, 2004, appellant gave birth to General H. West,
Jr. On September 28, 2004, ACCS filed a complaint that alleged the child to be neglected and dependent
and requested permanent custody.”).
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mother.249 At that point step two commences, which relieves the state
of any responsibility to make reasonable efforts to reunify the mother
with her newborn.250 Step three also comes from ASFA, which
requires the state to have a permanency hearing within thirty days of
the newborn’s removal and to make reasonable efforts for finalization
of the permanency plan.251
It is a common practice among agencies charged with protecting
children from abusive parents to preemptively remove newborns from
the custody of parents who have previously lost parental rights to a
sibling of the newborn.252 When a woman whose parental rights have
been involuntarily terminated in the past gives birth again in a hospital,
the child protection agency in that jurisdiction is notified of the
birth.253 The agency will typically remove the child from the custody
of his or her mother before she can leave the hospital with her new
baby.254 If a baby is not born in the hospital, child protection agencies
will remove the child as soon as they are notified of the birth. There
are obvious safeguards built into this system, all based on the
assumption that the mother of the child has a track record that makes
her too much of a risk to allow her to care for her newborn.255
In this scenario, which is actually not uncommon, the newborn has
been removed as a matter of course, without any determination that the
newborn’s parents have engaged in any abusive or neglectful behavior.
In fact, because the newborns are removed within a few hours to a few
days of their birth, it would take concerted effort on the parents’ part
to engage in abusive or neglectful behavior in the heavily supervised
and protective environment of a maternity and infant ward. At this
point, the reasonable efforts exception takes effect. It is not clear,
based on the language of the statute, exactly how states should
implement the provision, but the statute does make clear that it is not
249. See supra note 248.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2006).
251. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i).
252. See, e.g., Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 567; In re T.T.: S.T., 90 So. 3d at 1284; In re West, 2005 WL
1400029, at *1.
253. See In re T.T.: S.T., 90 So. 3d at 1284.
254. See id.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D).
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necessary to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and their
newborn.256 The reasonable efforts exception can be read two ways,
neither of which ends well for parents who hope to regain custody of
their newborn child.
The language of the reasonable efforts exception is ambiguous
about how it should be implemented. The relevant portion of the
provision states: “(D) reasonable efforts . . . shall not be required to be
made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent
jurisdiction has determined that . . . (iii) the parental rights of the parent
to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.”257 On one hand, the
provision could mean that only after a court of competent jurisdiction
has determined the parent was subject to involuntary termination of
parental rights in the past, regardless of whether a court or other state
agency terminated the parental rights, can reasonable efforts to reunify
the family be disregarded. On the other, it could mean the reasonable
efforts exception is applicable only if a court of competent jurisdiction
has terminated the parents’ rights to a sibling of the newborn at issue
now.258 In that case, the child protection agency would only need to
know of the prior involuntary termination (and of course it would
because the knowledge of the prior termination of parental rights is
what alerts the agency to remove the newborn in the first place) to
determine for itself that it need not make reasonable efforts to reunify
the family.
Even if a hearing is required to determine whether reasonable efforts
can be skipped by the agency, the court does not appear to have
discretion under ASFA to determine that reasonable efforts should be
made.259 The statute states that reasonable efforts to reunify families
“shall not be required to be made” when parents have lost their rights
256. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
257. Id.
258. At least one child protection agency determined the provision did not require a court to make the
decision that reasonable efforts were not required. In re Div. of Family Servs. v. James, 28 A.3d 480,
480–81 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2009). In that case, the Division of Family Services filed a motion in Family Court
averring that the Division, not the court, was the proper entity to determine that, because the mother had
involuntarily lost parental rights to a child in the past, ASFA did not require reasonable reunification
efforts. Id. However, the court disagreed that the Division was the appropriate decision maker. Id.
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
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previously.260 The court hearing, if there is one at all, is cursory, to
confirm that a parent’s rights have been terminated involuntarily in the
past.261 Either way, the determination that reasonable efforts are not
required is not a rigorous evidentiary analysis of parenting ability.
After whichever entity makes the determination that reasonable efforts
to reunify the family are not required, a court must move the process
along quickly to the next step.262
As soon as the exception to the reasonable efforts requirement has
been triggered, a court must start the permanency planning process.263
In fact, a court is required to hold a permanency planning hearing
within thirty days of the determination that reasonable efforts are not
required.264 As soon as the permanency hearing is held, the state must
begin making reasonable efforts to “place the child in a timely manner
in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever
steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the
child.”265 Within thirty days of the determination that reasonable
efforts to reunify are not required, a court must set a permanency plan
that must be implemented as quickly as possible.266 This rush to
finality gives parents no opportunity to show they are fit parents with
respect to their newborn child, and it allows courts to rely on an
adjudication of unfitness in the past as evidence of unfitness in the
future, which is a violation of the substantive and procedural due
process rights of parents.
B. Due Process Flaws With States’ Implementation of ASFA
The effect of this expedited process terminating parental rights is
that parents do not have adequate constitutional protection to regain
physical or legal custody of their children. It may be argued that the
process is not constitutionally flawed because the parents who have
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. § 671(a)(15)(D).
See id. § 671(a)(15)(E).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii).
Id. § 671(a)(15)(E).
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lost custody will have an opportunity to present evidence that they are
capable of properly caring for their newborn at the hearing to set a
permanency plan. The reasonable efforts exception and the rush to
permanency in ASFA, however, are procedurally flawed in two
fundamental ways. First, they allow evidence of a past adjudication of
fitness to be used against a parent at a later hearing about a different
child. Second, they are based on a presumption that once parents are
deemed unfit to parent they are forever unfit, thereby requiring parents
to prove, in a court of law, fitness to parent a later-born child. Those
flaws have been incorporated into how states proceed in terminating
parental rights and have resulted in unconstitutional practices that
violate the substantive and procedural due process rights of parents.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court considered the question of how
much procedural due process is required before a person’s liberty or
property interests can be invaded by the state.267 Recognizing, of
course, that not all liberty or property interests are the same, the Court
devised a three part balancing test to help courts determine the
appropriate level of caution when conducting a proceeding about the
invasion of a person’s liberty or property interests.268 The first part of
the test requires consideration of the private and government interests
at stake in the proceeding.269 Next, the risk of error in applying the
procedures already in place must be evaluated as well as how
beneficial additional procedural safeguards would be.270 Last, courts
evaluate the societal interest in avoiding potentially burdensome
procedural safeguards.271 When applied, these factors weigh heavily in
favor of more procedural safeguards in termination of parental rights
hearings when a parent has involuntarily lost rights in the past. Later,
when the Court decided Santosky v. Kramer, it relied partly upon
Mathews to determine that higher procedural protections were
constitutionally required in the context of protecting parents’
267. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–34 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes constraints
on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
268. Id. at 339–41, 343, 347.
269. Id. at 339–41.
270. Id. at 343.
271. Id. at 347.
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fundamental liberty interests in retaining custody of their children.272
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court determined that states
may not terminate parental rights without clear and convincing
evidence the termination was necessary to protect children from their
parents.273 Thus, states seeking to terminate rights are required to
include a procedure where proof that satisfies the high (although not
the highest) standard of clear and convincing evidence is presented to,
and evaluated by, the court.274 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, articulated the stakes for parents at risk of losing their
parental rights:
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family
life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections
than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family
affairs.275

The Court in Santosky carefully evaluated what the standard of
proof should be and concluded that a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard was too low to protect a parent’s constitutional rights.276
In Santosky, as stated in Part I.C.2., supra, the Supreme Court was
very concerned with protecting the procedural and substantive due
process rights of parents during termination of parental rights
proceedings. The Court rejected a “preponderance of the evidence
standard” as too low to protect a right that is “far more precious than
any property right.”277 The Court reasoned:
When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding,
it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest,

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754–62 (1982).
Id. at 769.
Id. at 769–70.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 758–59, 768.
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but to end it. “If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique
kind of deprivation . . . . A parent’s interest in the accuracy and
justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is,
therefore, a commanding one.”278

Unfortunately, the requirements of ASFA, and the ways states have
implemented them, have conspired to disregard parents’ fundamental
liberty interest in retaining custody of their children and to reject the
constitutional procedural safeguard of a high evidentiary standard for
termination of parental rights.
The constitutional problems with the expedited process in ASFA, as
applied in the states, can arise most significantly in two ways. First, it
allows the state to rely on evidence of abuse or neglect in the past to
prove that abuse or neglect will happen in the future. Second, the
process effectively shifts the burden of proof that someone is unfit
from the state to parents, who must then prove they are fit to parent the
child at issue. Both of these procedural requirements are inconsistent
with the definition of due process and do not comply with the
balancing test set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,
and they both ignore the Santosky requirement that a state must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit.279 The first
example of states’ unconstitutional application of ASFA-based
provisions expediting the termination of parental rights is exhibited
when states use evidence of past terminations to prove that termination
is again necessary.
1. Use of Past Behavior to Prove That Future Bad Behavior Will
Occur
The Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, in its determination that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states
to prove by a “clear and convincing” evidence standard that
termination of parental rights is necessary, relied on the balancing test
in Mathews v. Eldridge to reason that a stricter standard of proof would
278. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
279. Id. at 769; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–41, 343, 347 (1976).
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not unconstitutionally burden the government.280 In Santosky, the
Court took particular interest in the fact that the proceedings against
the parents in question were very similar to criminal proceedings.281
The state presented evidence against the parents in accordance with
formal rules of evidence, each party was represented by counsel, the
state established facts about the family’s willingness or unwillingness
to participate in reunification efforts, the parties called and crossexamined witnesses, and the court made a determination based on the
evidence.282 This similarity to a criminal trial was an important
consideration for the Court in determining that a “preponderance of
the evidence” standard was not enough to protect the fundamental
parental rights at stake.283 Despite the fact that proceedings to
terminate parental rights, unless they are initiated pursuant to ICWA,
do not require the state to prove unfitness “beyond a reasonable
doubt,” the level of care that must be taken to ensure constitutional
fairness when terminating parental rights has been recognized by the
Supreme Court to be extremely high.284 If parents’ liberty interest to
custody of their children is severed, it is gone forever with respect to
those children.285 To then permit evidence of that prior termination to
be used against a parent in future adjudications of their fitness is to
perpetuate the ultimate parental penalty forever.
Unfortunately, ASFA has incentivized states to adopt a process that
not only ignores this important foundational notion in our
jurisprudence, but encourages state courts to flout it.286 By allowing
states to rely on evidence that parents have had their rights
involuntarily terminated in the past to forego reasonable efforts to
reunite the family and to move forward with permanency planning
immediately, Congress has presumed that a past adjudication of
unfitness serves to prove unfitness in the future. States have taken
280. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754–62.
281. Id. at 762 (“In New York, the factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding
bears many of the indicia of a criminal trial.”).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 762–64.
284. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
285. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748–50.
286. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)–(E) (2006).
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these provisions to heart and have relied on them to show that parental
rights should be terminated with respect to children who have not been
subjected to abuse or neglect by their parents.287 First, states allow
child protection agencies to remove children without any evidence that
they have been abused or neglected, to deny parents any and all
assistance that may result in their regaining custody of those children,
and to rely on speculative “evidence” that future abuse may occur to
terminate parental rights.288 Even before ASFA made it desirable for
all states to do so, some states had determined that a previous
adjudication of unfitness could be used to show that a person was unfit
to parent later children.289
In 1991, the Florida Supreme Court considered Padgett v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.290 In Padgett, the
court considered the appeal of parents who had lost custody to five
other children due to abuse and neglect.291 The appeal considered the
lower court’s decision to terminate parental rights to a newborn who
was removed from the parents’ custody two days after she was born,
specifically addressing “whether prospective abuse, neglect or
abandonment can serve as grounds for terminating parental rights.”292
The court held that, while parental rights are a fundamental liberty
interest that are protected by the Due Process Clause, if the state can
show by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at
substantial risk of significant harm upon reunification, then
speculation that the parent would commit future child abuse based
upon a past finding of abuse was constitutionally permissible.293
It is clear that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Padgett made
the state’s job in proving that parental rights should be terminated with
respect to a later-born child much easier if those parents had already
lost parental rights to siblings of that child. The court did not, however,
287. See, e.g., In re T.S.B., 177 P.3d 429, 435 (Mont. 2008); In re D.B., Nos. 03CA0015-M,
03CA0018-M, 2003 WL 22015445, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003).
288. See supra note 287.
289. See In re J.L. & D.L., 891 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
290. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
291. Id. at 566.
292. Id. at 568.
293. Id. at 570–71.
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rely solely on the fact that the parents had lost parental rights before.294
The court did emphasize that the lower court had relied upon evidence
of abuse and neglect from the previous dependency adjudications to
evaluate that the current termination was proper:
The question before us today is whether this abuse, neglect or
abandonment must concern the present child, or whether it can
concern some other child. Based on our above analysis, we hold
that the permanent termination of a parent’s rights in one child
under circumstances involving abuse or neglect may serve as
grounds for permanently severing the parent’s rights in a different
child.295

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the unfair use of evidence against
a defendant, particularly when it is not relevant to the accusation at
hand or is more prejudicial than probative of guilt;296 whatever level
of protection those due process requirements may have provided to
Florida parents was lowered after the passage of ASFA.
In ASFA, there is no requirement that courts evaluate the facts and
circumstances proved in a past termination of parental rights to support
termination in a present case.297 ASFA simply states that states are not
required to engage in reasonable efforts to reunite children with
parents who have lost parental rights in the past.298 Furthermore, the
provisions allow states to move forward with permanency planning
and reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan within thirty
days of a determination that the parents have previously lost their

294. Id. at 567.
295. Id. at 571.
296. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process
is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence whether true or false.”); FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding irrelevant evidence); FED. R. EVID. 403
(requiring exclusion of evidence that is more prejudicial than probative); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (prohibiting
the use of evidence of past crimes, unless needed to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”).
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2006).
298. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
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parental rights.299 The fact that the past termination has happened is
enough to support a finding that the current termination is proper,
without any consideration of whether the parents actually exhibited
abusive or neglectful behavior in the past.300 This allows states to
permanently prohibit people from being parents after only one
previous involuntary termination, no matter the past or present
circumstances. But even if states are not taking the opportunity to
simply rely on the fact that a prior involuntary termination happened,
they are willing to interpret ASFA to condone Florida’s practice of
applying evidence of past abuse or neglect to support terminations in
the present.301
In Ohio, the Court of Appeals considered the case of two parents
whose rights to a newborn were terminated based on no evidence that
the child had been abused and only speculation that abuse could occur
in the future.302 The newborn was removed from the parents’ custody
four days after he was born.303 A trial court determined that reasonable
efforts were not required to reunite the family because the parents had
lost custody to two siblings of the newborn in the past.304 The state
held a dependency hearing, in which the infant was declared a
dependent of the state because his parents were unfit to care for him,
and immediately moved to terminate parental rights to the newborn.305
Both parents appealed the ruling on several grounds, including that the
determination the child should be declared dependent was an
“anticipatory dependency.”306
The appellate court disagreed that the dependency determination
was anticipatory.307 First, it said the determination was based on
evidence that two older siblings of the newborn were also adjudicated
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as dependent, and their parents’ rights had been terminated as well.308
The court stated that ample evidence existed concerning the parents’
lack of custodial skills with respect to the older children.309
Additionally, the appellate court pointed out that several witnesses had
testified as to the appellants’ ability to parent the newborn.310 The
parents had been urged to take parenting classes while pregnant with
the child at issue and had not done so.311 The witnesses also testified
that the parents would need help caring for the newborn but that they
had not put in place a plan to provide for that care.312 The witnesses
further testified they were concerned the parents would expose the
newborn to high-risk individuals they allowed into their home.313
Although there may have been legitimate concern for the welfare of
the child, the court relied on constitutionally impermissible evidence
of past problems to uphold the lower court’s termination of parental
rights.314
In another case where a court upheld the termination of parental
rights based on evidence of past abuse, the Supreme Court of Montana
considered the constitutionality of the state’s version of ASFA.315 Like
in ASFA, Montana’s statutory scheme permits the state to forego
reasonable efforts to reunify parents with a removed child if the parents
have lost parental rights involuntarily in the past.316 Unlike in ASFA,
however, the Montana statute requires the circumstances of the past
termination be “relevant to the parents’ ability to care for the child
currently at issue.”317 The parents in In re T.S.B. had lost parental
rights to five other children at various times in the past.318 Within three
days of her birth, T.S.B. was removed from her parents’ custody by
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the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS).319
Two days later DPHHS filed for a determination that reasonable
efforts to reunite the family were not required, that the parents’ rights
should be terminated, and for permanent custody of the child.320 Based
on evidence that the parents had been subject to involuntary
termination of their parental rights in the past, the district court entered
an order stating the state had established probable cause that T.S.B.
was a “youth in need of care.”321
True, Montana requires more than ASFA does to support the
termination of parental rights for persons whose rights were previously
terminated in that it requires the state to show evidence of past abuse
or neglect, not just the fact of a termination.322 But that is not enough
of a safeguard to protect parents from due process violations. The use
of past evidence of abuse or neglect is simply not adequate to prove by
“clear and convincing evidence” that termination of parental rights to
a different child is necessary. Particularly in situations when a newborn
is removed from parents’ custody before they have ever really been
alone with the child, not only is there not enough evidence to support
the charge of parental unfitness with respect to this child, there is not
any evidence to that effect. At least a few states have recognized that
people can change, they mature, their circumstances in life improve,
and that using evidence of past fitness against them is not lawful to
show they will be bad parents in the future.323
There have been cases where courts have refused to allow the
termination of parental rights based on evidence of past termination.
In Kansas, before ASFA was passed, an appellate court applied the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the constitutionality
of a state statute permitting the state to seek termination of parental
rights based on evidence of prior loss of parental rights.324 The lower
court had terminated the mother’s parental rights without a single piece
319.
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321.
322.
323.
324.
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of evidence that termination was necessary other than a certified copy
of a journal entry from an eight-year-old rights termination involving
another child of the mother.325 The court concluded that the lower
court’s application of the statute was a clear violation of the mother’s
due process rights and was wholly out of procedural due process
bounds:
In this state, we do not allow a defendant to be convicted of
burglary upon proof that he was convicted of that crime eight
years ago. We would not permit a finding of negligence to stand
if it were based on nothing more than an eight-year-old prior
adjudication of negligence. In neither instance would we permit a
showing of a prior conviction of a crime or a prior adjudication of
negligence to shift or change the burden of proof. Why should the
issue of unfitness be treated any differently?326

The Kansas appellate court in J.L. did not strike the state statute the
lower court relied upon as unconstitutional because the statute actually
required courts to do more than rely upon evidence of a prior
determination of an involuntary termination of parental rights.327 But
the court did make clear that the liberty interests of the mother were
weightier than those of the state, that her due process rights had been
violated by the lower court, and that other courts should not be in the
practice of applying eight-year-old adjudications as evidence in
support of present terminations.328
In a similar situation, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has held that, even though the Department of Health and
Human Resources is statutorily required to file for the termination of
parental rights of all children born to parents whose past rights have
been involuntarily terminated, a court must determine if the child at
issue has suffered abuse or neglect before the parents’ rights can be
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terminated in the present case.329 Reasoning that many factors can
change for the better in a person’s life that would significantly improve
his or her ability to parent a child, the court held that a lower court
cannot terminate parental rights to a child without any evidence that
child has suffered abuse or neglect.330
In an Arkansas case, an appellate court overturned a lower court’s
decision to terminate parental rights after one hearing in which the
state presented no evidence of unfitness other than the fact that the
parent’s rights had been involuntarily terminated in the past.331 The
court of appeals held that, while there was clear and convincing
evidence the parents had been subject to involuntary termination of
parental rights in the past, there was not clear and convincing evidence
that termination would be in the best interests of the child presently
before the court.332 The additional provision of the Arkansas code
requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard showing the best
interests of the child333 served to protect the parents from what would
have been an automatic severance of their parental rights based on their
past termination. ASFA does not require states implementing it to have
such a procedural safeguard; if Arkansas had decided to incorporate
ASFA as is, the parents in this case would have been without remedy.
And in a Florida case, a lower court terminated a mother’s parental
rights to her twins because of the involuntary termination of another
child five years prior to the twins’ birth.334 The appellate court held
that the lower court improperly terminated the mother’s parental rights
to the twins based on evidence that another of her children had suffered
injuries while in her custody years earlier.335 The court stated:
DCF failed to present any evidence that the mother suffers from
any mental illness, drug addiction, or other impairments that
would cause her to be a danger to her children or render her
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
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incapable of reestablishing a relationship with them. DCF
essentially argued that the severity of the injuries to the sibling
child . . . was sufficient to find that there was a substantial risk of
significant harm to the twins . . . . Based on the evidence presented
at the hearing, however, DCF did not meet its burden to show that
the twins are at a substantial risk of significant harm.336

Unfortunately, not every court may be as careful to avoid
improperly severing parental rights when the only evidence is from
past adjudications, especially considering how ASFA creates a
procedural structure that at least implies the safeguards applied in the
above cases are not necessary. In addition to the problem with relying
on old evidence to prove new allegations, statutes relying on ASFA
improperly incentivize courts to improperly shift the burden of proof
away from states, who should have to prove that parents are a risk to
their children, to parents to demonstrate fitness.
2. Shifting the Burden of Proof to Parents
The expedited process provisions in ASFA essentially set up a
procedural trap that puts parents in the position of proving they can be
good parents, instead of requiring states to carry the burden of proof,
by clear and convincing evidence, that parents are a risk to their
children.337 By encouraging states to skip making reasonable efforts to
reunite families because of a prior termination of parental rights,
ASFA built in a presumption that reuniting such families would be
futile. Also, because they are required to seek a permanency hearing
within thirty days of a determination that reasonable efforts are not
required, there is no opportunity for states to gather evidence showing
the parent is unfit. That means the only evidence a court could rely
upon to terminate parental rights in the case before it is evidence of a
prior termination, as discussed in Section III.B.1, supra. This puts
parents in the position of having to prove their fitness instead of
requiring states to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the
336. Id.
337. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2006); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
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parents’ unfitness.
Some states have not been coy about their interpretation of the
expedited process provisions of ASFA; that is, once it has been
determined that a parent has involuntarily lost parental rights in the
past, the state and court’s presumptions are then that the person is unfit
to parent any future children.338 Only if the parent is able to prove that
she is now fit can she overcome that presumption. And in some states,
even though the statute may not have a presumption of unfitness
explicitly built in, the application of the expedited termination of
parental rights provisions serve to create a presumption of unfitness.
In Ohio, an appellate court reviewed and upheld the termination of
parental rights with respect to a statute that included an express
presumption of unfitness when a parent had lost rights involuntarily in
the past.339 There, the father of the child was unable to challenge the
constitutionality of the presumption against him because he had failed
to raise that argument during the hearings below.340 The court upheld
the termination of his parental rights based on the statute and upheld
the termination of the mother’s parental rights based on evidence used
in a prior hearing to show she was an unfit parent to three other
children.341 The state relied upon evidence that she was unfit to raise
her newborn as her other three children had been removed two years
before because she failed to maintain a clean home.342 No new
evidence was introduced that her home was still dirty at the time the
child at issue was born, and the mother did introduce some evidence

338. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271(a)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sess.)
(presuming that a parent is unfit if the state can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
has been declared unfit in the past); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5(a)(3) (West, WestlawNext through 2013
First Extraordinary Sess.) (requiring the Department of Health and Human Services to file a motion to
terminate parental rights if the parent has lost parental rights involuntarily in the past); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.414(E)(11) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 130th Gen.
Assembly) (“The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the
child . . . and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding
the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for
the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”).
339. In re Cazad, No. 04CA36, 2005 WL 1228386, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. May 9, 2005).
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that she had improved her ability to keep her home clean.343 The
appellate court did not consider the lower court’s reliance on the old
evidence and upheld the termination, essentially stating the mother
carried the burden of proof to show that she was a fit parent and that
she failed to meet it.344
In a 2007 Montana case, the appellate court upheld a termination of
parental rights after the lower court heard evidence that the mother’s
rights should be terminated because her parental rights had been
previously terminated, leaving her the burden of disproving a
presumption of unfitness.345 The appellate court rejected her
contention that the statute created a presumption against her because
the state was required to show (1) that her parental rights had been
terminated before and (2) that the prior termination was relevant to the
current termination.346 The court also noted earlier in the opinion that
the mother had the opportunity to present evidence of her fitness at
trial and had chosen not to do so.347 The court reasoned that its
procedures were constitutionally sound because it could consider
evidence of abuse or neglect with respect to the child at issue, like
courts in other states with similar provisions.348 Unfortunately,
however, the court did not actually consider any evidence regarding
the child at issue and relied instead on evidence from the earlier
terminations, thereby requiring the mother to prove the evidence from
the earlier terminations was not relevant to the current proceeding.349
A year later, the Montana Supreme Court considered an appeal from
the termination of a father’s parental rights to a newborn who had
never been in his physical custody.350 The father argued the lower
court’s procedure of relying on evidence of prior terminations
unconstitutionally shifted to him the burden to prove he was a fit
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parent.351 Because the father received notice of the hearing to terminate
his parental rights, and he had an opportunity to present evidence to
“rebut the State’s allegations and show changed circumstances,” he
was not disadvantaged at the hearing.352 The court noted that the father
“chose not to present any witnesses or evidence demonstrating
changed circumstances.”353 The court concluded, in the same breath,
that “[t]he statutory scheme did not create a presumption against [the
father] as the burden remained on the State.”354
Although it is common practice in some states to allow the burden
to shift to parents to prove their fitness following a showing they had
lost parental rights involuntarily in the past, some courts have called
the practice or policy into question. In a Kansas case decided before
ASFA was passed, for example, a court of appeals considered whether
a rebuttable presumption of unfitness written into the procedural
requirements in termination proceedings complied with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.355 The court held that
although evidence of a prior adjudication of unfitness could be
probative in a future hearing about the parent’s fitness, it is
unconstitutional to require parents to prove their fitness by clear and
convincing evidence.356 The court lowered the standard applied to
parents presenting evidence to rebut the presumption of their unfitness
to “a preponderance of the evidence,” but the court declined to declare
unconstitutional the statute shifting the burden to the parents.357
In L.D.B., the Kansas appellate court relied upon Supreme Court
precedent to show that it is not always improper for a state to shift the
burden of proof onto the non-moving party.358 In Turnipseed, the
Supreme Court considered whether a statute using evidence that an
individual sustained an injury on a train as prima facie evidence of
negligence violated the Due Process Clause by shifting the burden of
351.
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358.
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proof to a defendant.359 The Court held that the burden shift did not
violate the Due Process Clause if there was a reasonable opportunity
for the defendant to submit his own evidence in his defense.360 The
Court based its holding, however, on the premise that the legislative
provision prescribing a rule of evidence, either in a civil or criminal
matter, not be “unreasonable in itself.”361 In the case of ASFA,
provisions permitting states to rely on evidence that a person behaved
badly in the past toward a different child to prove the person will
behave badly in the future allow the state to invade a fundamental
liberty interest. They also shift the burden to disprove that old evidence
and are therefore unreasonable and cannot stand.
C. Applying the Mathews Balancing Test and the Santosky
Standard to Termination of Parental Rights in the States
If Congress had heeded, in drafting ASFA, or states adhered to, in
implementing ASFA, the Court’s balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge, it would be clear that the states’ interests in the expedited
procedures in ASFA do not outweigh the fundamental liberty interests
to parent. Also, if the drafters and implementers of ASFA had kept in
mind the constitutional element that parental rights to a child can only
be terminated upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that
the termination is necessary as required by Santosky v. Kramer, the
expedited procedures for termination of parental rights would not be
in use today. The expedited procedures in ASFA are woefully deficient
when it comes to their constitutionality. Unfortunately, these
procedures routinely—likely daily—serve as the basis for terminating
parental rights in states throughout the country.362
When applying the expedited termination provisions in ASFA to the
Mathews test to determine whether they are constitutionally sound
procedures, it is clear they are not. The Mathews test is a three-part
analysis that requires balancing the interests of parents subject to
359.
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involuntary termination of their parental rights against those of the
state and public to seek efficient resolutions to problems.363 The
Mathews test first requires that courts look at the interests of the private
party on the receiving end of the governmental action.364 The private
interest that would be affected by the governmental action in this
situation is that which has been deemed one of the most important
fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution.365 When it is
severed, the damage is permanent. Unlike persons sentenced to jail for
a portion of their lives and who will ultimately regain their freedom, a
parent who loses parental rights is forever without them.366
The second consideration in the Mathews test is the level of risk in
erroneous deprivation of rights when applying the procedures and the
probable value of any additional procedural safeguards that might be
implemented.367 In the case of termination of parental rights based on
a past involuntary termination, the risk of error is extremely high when
states are permitted to use evidence that is wholly unrelated to the
matter before the court. Evidence of past bad behavior cannot serve to
prove that future bad behavior is so likely to occur that a permanent
severance of parental rights is justified. One of the most fundamental
principles of the American judicial system is the idea that people are
“innocent until prove[n] guilty” of the crime for which they have been
accused368 and that later behavior will be judged independently of past
behavior.
The third factor in the Mathews test requires the court to consider
the public interest in preserving the procedural status quo, including
the potential costs of additional or different procedural safeguards.369
One interest of the government in expediting termination of parental
rights is to protect children from abusive or neglectful parents.370 But,
rushing that process is not necessarily going to protect children from
363.
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370.
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parents who might do them harm. Once the children have been
removed from their parents’ custody, there is little harm in making the
same reasonable efforts to reunify the family as are made for other
families. Those children have already been placed somewhere they are
supposed to be safe, and taking an additional few months to a year to
help their parents address their shortcomings is preferable to risk
terminating parental rights of those who have the ability to parent. The
efficiency of rushing to termination is lost when the termination never
should have happened at all.
On the assumption that there will be parents aplenty to adopt them,
another reason the government has sought to expedite the procedures
for terminating parental rights is based on the theory that doing so will
free children for adoption as quickly as possible.371 This assumption
has proven untrue in the years since ASFA was passed. Children are
essentially becoming orphaned instead of remaining in foster care until
their parents can regain custody, or they age out of the system.372 This
has created a huge administrative burden on states that are responsible
for figuring out what to do with all of the state-created orphans who
are not supposed to be languishing in foster care.373 Changing the
procedural safeguards to allow parents who have involuntarily lost
parental rights in the past more time to show that they can adequately
parent their children would likely not create more of an administrative
burden than the current system does.
Another way that ASFA and its progeny statutes have impeded the
due process rights of parents is through their disregard for applying the
“clear and convincing evidence” standard required by Santosky. States
have implemented provisions requiring clear and convincing evidence
of prior termination of parental rights be proved at a hearing to
terminate parental rights to subsequent children of those parents, but
all that requires is a showing of past bad behavior toward different
children.374 That requirement cannot be considered constitutionally
adequate to support the termination of a fundamental constitutional
371.
372.
373.
374.

See supra note 213.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
Tacoma, supra note 245, at 3–4.
See supra note 338.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/1

62

Fershee: The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of Severing Parent

2014]UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF SEVERING PARENTAL RIGHTS 701

right to a different child. Clear and convincing evidence that the parent
is unfit to parent this child is the only standard that can satisfy the high
level of protection afforded to substantive and procedural due process
rights. Using past evidence of bad behavior to prove future bad
conduct is certainly not clear and convincing evidence. In fact, it is no
evidence at all.
CONCLUSION
It took far too long for the public consciousness to accept that child
abuse and neglect are a societal problem that can be addressed by the
state. It took even longer for the Supreme Court to recognize that
courts should evaluate those accusations of neglect and abuse with the
highest order of care because the Constitution requires that the rights
of parents to raise their children be carefully protected. But when the
public, lawmakers, and judges all arrived at the current level of
consciousness about child abuse and neglect, they chose solutions to
the problem that are not consistent with the constitutional rights of the
interested parties. Congress overshot its goal to reduce the number of
children in foster care by unconstitutionally severing the fundamental
rights of parents.
Congress and the Supreme Court must address this problem and
begin the process of allowing families to repair themselves before they
are permanently torn apart. Congress can do its part by changing
ASFA to ease the lightning-fast provisions of expedited termination of
parental rights in cases where parents have involuntarily lost parental
rights in the past. If ASFA simply dropped that one provision, states
could return to giving parents who have previously lost parental rights
a chance to regain custody of the later-born children. While
reunification services may be perceived by some to be expensive,
especially because they are unlikely to actually help, it is a less
expensive solution in the long run to help parents retain their rights
rather than leave the state to try and place children into adoptive homes
that, by and large, do not exist. One to two years of reunification
services for parents, who can then regain custody of their children and
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bear all the costs of raising them, is a much smaller price for the state
to pay than up to eighteen years of foster care.
Even if Congress were to amend ASFA, thereby requiring states to
drop their exemption of reasonable efforts provisions, it may be
necessary for the Supreme Court to make clear to states that their
procedures for termination of parental rights may be unconstitutional.
Prior to ASFA, states engaged in expedited termination processes that
ran afoul of the Due Process Clause. If ASFA were to change, some
states may try to rely on state court precedent to continue those
unconstitutionally expedited termination proceedings. In that case, the
Supreme Court should make clear that (1) relying on evidence of past
determinations of unfitness cannot serve as proof of unfitness for other
children, and (2) that shifting the burden to parents to prove their
fitness, rather than the state proving they are unfit, is not
constitutionally reasonable and does not comply with Santosky v.
Kramer. Anything less would allow states to continue hurting parents
and their children by using assumptions and conjecture against them
to justify permanently depriving them of their parental rights.
The right to parent cannot forever be severed by the state based on
a determination that a person was not a good parent to a child in the
past. Each time a parent has a child, that parent should receive full
constitutional protection during the process to decide whether he or
she can parent this child. The societal costs of requiring the state to
engage in a careful determination of the person’s ability to parent is
minimal compared to the societal costs of living in a country that
permits the state to permanently judge someone incapable of
parenting, no matter the reality. The risk that parents who would be no
worse than any other parent lose their parental rights to every child
born to them in the future is far too great to justify the efficiency of
trying to free children for adoption, especially when it is clear that most
children will not ever be adopted anyway. Lawmakers and judges need
to start relying on their own rhetoric about the value of supporting
families and apply those ideals to all families, even the imperfect ones.
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